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CASE NOTES
chain of causation. But, in Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp. the follow-
ing statement is found:
Foreseeability in causation means foreseeability of intervening causes only; it
does not include foreseeability of consequences. A consequence which follows
directly either from defendant's act or from a foreseeably caused intervening
act is proximate.' 8
In Illinois, the case of Libby, McNeill and Libby v. Illinois District
Telephone Co., although holding upon the facts that there was no fore-
seeability, stated:
Defendant's negligence is too remote to constitute the proximate cause where
an independent illegal act of a third person, which could not reasonably have
been foreseen, and without which such injury would not have been sustained,
intervenes. A person is not bound to anticipate the malicious or criminal acts
of others by which damage is inflicted, even though they are the acts of chil-
dren. But where an independent illegal act was of a nature which might have
been anticipated and which it was the defendant's duty to provide against, he
will be liable for breach of such duty not-withstanding the production of in-
juries by the intervention of an act of the character described. 19
Alabama, by this decision, holds, that insurance companies are liable to
insured persons for injuries which result from the impetus given buyers of
the insurance who have no insurable interest, to commit acts which public
policy condemns and which by virtue of this same public policy, the insur-
ance companies are bound to foresee. With the use of reasoning similar to
that used by the Alabama court in the instant case, the majority of courts
which hold such insurance contracts void as against public policy (includ-
ing Illinois whose public policy is much more vigorous in its condemna-
tion) may very well hold insurance companies liable under similar factual
arrangements.
18 97 Cal. 2d 418, 218 P. 2d 43, 48 (1950). See also, Watson v. Southern Bus Lines, 186
F. 2d 981 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795 (E.D.
Pa., 1951); Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P. 2d 257 (1952); De La Torre v. Valen-
zuela, 102 Cal. App. 2d 586, 228 P. 2d 13 (1951).
19 249 Ill. App. 93, 13 N.E. 2d 683 (1938) (emphasis supplied).
TAXATION-LIABILITY OF BENEFICIARY OF LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY FOR UNPAID TAXES
OF DECEDENT DETERMINED
Two recent Supreme Court cases have finally settled the question of
liability of the beneficiary of a life insurance policy for the unpaid income
taxes of the decedent.
In the first case, the decedent was a resident of Kentucky. Six years
after his death the Tax Court held that he had been deficient in his income
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taxes for the years 1944 through 1947 and was liable for $32,777.51, in-
cluding interest and penalties.1 The Commissioner proceeded under Sec-
tion 311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19392 against the taxpayer's
widow, as beneficiary of life insurance policies held by decedent. The
right to change the beneficiary and to -draw on the cash surrender value of
the policies had been retained. The Supreme Court held that the widow,
as beneficiary, was not liable for the tax deficiencies. Commissioner v.
Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
In the second case the facts are essentially the same, except for the fact
that the Commissioner had demanded payment of back taxes during the
decedent's lifetime. Here the Supreme Court held the beneficiary liable
for the tax deficiencies. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
Although the Code provisions for enforcement of transferee liability 3
are purely procedural, 4 there has been conflict between the Courts of
Appeal and the Tax Courts on whether the substantive liability of the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy is to be determined by state or by
federal law. The Courts of Appeal that have decided the question hold
that state law rather than federal law determines the substantive liability
in transferee cases.5 The Tax Courts, however, have held that such cases
should be governed by federal law.0
In the Stern and Bess cases, the Supreme Court expressly decided this
I Stern v. Commissioner, (1955 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., par. 55,040).
226 U.S.C.A. § 311 (a) (1) (f) (1956) which provides. "(a) Method of collection.
The amounts of the following liabilities shall ex&ept as hereinafter in this section pro-
vided, be assessed, collected, and paid for in the same manner and subject to the
same limitations as in the case of a deficiency in a tax imposed by this chapter (in-
cluding the provisions in case of delinquency in payment after notice and demand, the
provisions authorizing distraint and proceedings in court for collection, and the provi-
sions prohibiting claims and suits for refunds):
"(1) Transferees. The liability at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a
taxpayer, in respect to the tax (including interest, additional amounts, and additions to
the tax provided by law) imposed upon the taxpayer by this chapter.
"(f) Definition of transferee. As used in this section, the term transferee includes
heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee."
3 Ibid.
4 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F. 2d
350 (C.A. 9th, 1941); Liquidators of Exchange National Bank v. United States, 65 F. 2d
316 (C.A. 5th, 1933); Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 50 F. 2d 138 (C.A. 2d, 1931).
5 United States v. Truax, 223 F. 2d 229 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Rowen v. Commissioner,
215 F. 2d 641 (C.A. 2d, 1954); Tyson v. Commissioner, 212 F. 2d 16 (C.A. 6th, 1954);
United States v. New, 217 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 7th, 1954).
6 Stoumen v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1014 (1957), pend. C.A. 2d; Rowen v. Commis-
sioner, 18 T.C. 874 (1953), rev'd supra; Tyson v. Commissioner, (1953 P-H T.C. Memo.
Dec., par. 53, 198). In the Stoumen case the Tax Court reconsidered the question thor-
oughly, noting its awareness of the appellate decisions to the contrary, and reasserted
its prior decision.
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question, which it had previously left open,' in accordance with the view
expressed by the United States Court of Appeals.s In following this view
the Court used the rationale expressed in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest Court in a decision is not a matter of Federal concern. There is no
Federal general common law.9
As already mentioned, the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provisions for
enforcement of transferee liability are purely procedural. Therefore, since
Congress has not laid down a specific law governing these matters, the
laws of the states must be referred to in solving questions of this nature.
In the Stern case, the Court decided that under the applicable Kentucky
statute' ° the widow was not liable as a transferee for any part of the
decedent's unpaid taxes. The court reached the same conclusion in the
Bess case under appropriate New Jersey law." However, in the latter case
the Internal Revenue Service had given notice and made demand for taxes
during the decedent's lifetime, and since he had not made payment, a lien
against the cash surrender value of his life insurance policy came into
being. This lien was in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, which states: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
to pay the same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the
United States, upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person."' 2
The question now arises, did the decedent have "property or rights to
-Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1951).
8 Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 at 40-47 (1958); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51
at 53-54 (1958).
9 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
10 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) § 297.140 provides: "A policy of insurance for the benefit
of a married woman shall inure to her separate use and benefit . . .independently of
her husband or his creditors ... subject to the provision that an amount equal to any
premiums paid by any person in defraud of creditors, shall inure to their benefit."
§ 297.150- "The lawful beneficiary thereof ... shall be entitled to the proceeds against
the creditors affecting the same."
11 17 N.J. Stat. Anno. (Penn. Ed.) § 34-28-Beneficiary's Right to Proceeds: "When a
policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life . . . in favor of a person
other than himself having an insurable interest therein, the lawful beneficiary thereof
... shall be entitled to its proceeds, against the creditors and representatives of the
person effecting it ... subject to the Statute of Limitations, the amount of any premium
for insurance paid in fraud of creditors, shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds
of the policy." § 34-29-Policies to Inure to Benefit of Married Women: "Every policy
of life insurance to or for the benefit of a married woman ... shall inure to her separate
use and benefit, and to that of her children. . .
1226 U.S.C.A. § 3660 (1938).
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property" in his insurance policies to which the lien might attach? In
Rowen v. Commissioner,13 it was held that the insured never has a right to
the proceeds of his insurance policy. Using this reasoning in the Bess case,
the Court held that the proceeds could not come under the meaning of
property as used in the Internal Revenue Code. 14 As for the cash surrender
value of the policy, however, the Court felt that this was "property" of
the insured. Numerous courts have held that a lien attaches to the cash
surrender values of insurance policies, since these are clearly assets of the
decedent during his lifetime. 15 These surrender values are not wiped out
upon the death of the insured, but rather, merge in the proceeds. As a
result, the lien remains attached, because the transfer of property subse-
quent to the attachment of a lien does not affect the lien.' 6 For "it is of the
very nature and essence of a lien, that no matter into whose hands the
property goes, it passes cur onere; if this were not the case it would cease
to be a lien." 17 Therefore, the surrender values merge in the proceeds with
the lien attached, and the lien remains enforceable.' 8
Thus, the, Supreme Court has finally settled the question of the liability
of a transferee of an insurance policy for the unpaid taxes of the decedent.
It will be interesting to note the different decisions that will arise in the
Tax Courts because of the diversity of the laws of the several states.
13 215 F. 2d 641 (CA. 2d, 1954).
14Authority cited note 12, supra.
1 United States v. Royce Shoe Co., 137 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.H., 1956); Knox v. Great
West Life Assur. Co., 109 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mich., 1952), aff'd per curiam 212 F. 2d
784 (C.A. 6th, 1954); Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. La., 1946); United States
v. Ison, 67 F. Supp. 40 S.D.N.Y., 1946); United States v Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
54 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa., 1944); United States v. Trout, 46 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal.,
1942).
16 Blacklock v. United States, 208 U.S. 75 (1908); United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S.
210 (1893).
1" Burton v. Smith, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 462, 483 (1839).
18 United States v. Hoper, 242 F. 2d 468 (C.A. 7th, 1957); United States v. Behrens,
230 F. 2d 504 (C.A. 2d, 1956).
